

# The Model of Executive Elections in the Local Context in the Reformation Era: The Model of Village Head Election in the Local Context

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**Abstract**---At the legal system domain, the democratic transition in Indonesia is characterized by a change in the local leader election system, from a non-direct election by the member of the representative body to direct election by people. The application of direct election system in local political leader recruitment is normatively aimed to (1) improve the accessibility of the recruiting process of a local political leader, (2) to bring in a more politics local political leader, and (3) to minimize the possibility the money politics in the election of local political leaders. The phenomenon of direct election for a local political leader during 2005-2006, however, shows the different fact. Money politics occurs everywhere. Defining politics as the struggle for power, this research is intended to (1) discover the signification of money politics in the winning process of local political leader candidates, (2) to describe the way of the money politics works in the winning process of the local political leader candidates, (3) to specify the functions of money politics in the winning process of local political leader candidates. A district with high economic attractiveness was selected as the research site. A qualitative-descriptive analytical strategy was applied to analyze the gathered data in the form of formal document and published news, observational field notes, and the records of in-depth interviews with all main actors and the key informants of the election of a local political leader. The findings show a number of threats of money politics have been anticipated and have been tried to prevent systematically by establishing related regulations and administering the supervisory committee and independent monitoring institutions. It is evident that money is the most necessary means to win the very tight rivalry in local political leader election since it can be converted into or exchanged with the other necessary means. The absolute nature of money as a means in attaining the goal of local political leader candidates gives the opportunity for the political croupier to enter and intervene in the process local political leader election. In the context of the relationship between the actors of local political leader election, money serves as the most certain binding. Such binding will influence the public policy decision made by the elected political leader so that gives special advantages to the political croupier. The first implication of this research is on the transition to democracy. At the political behaviour domain, the democratic transition in Indonesia, as reflected in the direct local leader election, is characterized by the emergence of money-oriented pragmatism, so that: (1) directing the transition from people to money sovereignty oriented transition, (2) fertilizing pragmatic political behaviour both among the elite and the massive voters, (3) and lessening the influence of political ideology upon the peoples' electoral behaviour. The second implication is on the refinement of the dimension of power, from the dichotomous model to the continuum one. The change from potential to actual power is triggered by the dynamics of political life. There is exchange-based power which is located between the consensus-based and coercion-based power. In term of public morality, the practice of money politics will result in a less legitimated local leader, so that property-based power which is located between the occupation-based power and personality-based power. There is a type of sensible but unproven power which is located between the implicit and explicit power. There is a type of liaison power which is stronger than, and bridges the direct and non-direct power. The third implication is on the theory of the basis of power. The domination of the economic elite in local power structure affects the basis of power form cultural-based power to material-based power. This phenomenon lessens the popularity of political ideologies and fertilizing the pragmatism in the elite's and mass' political behaviour. The findings are, however, rejects Marx's hypothesis of base determinism over the legal system, but they are still powerful in influencing the

implementation of the legal system in line with their interests. Finally, the Parsons' theory of voluntary action which was offered as a theoretical perspective is consequently insufficient to explain the phenomena of money politics in the local political leader election. Parsons' theoretical model needs to be advanced by (1) adding the Marx's theory of capital structuralism which affirms the significant meaning of capital in shaping societal behaviour, and (2) involving the Mead's agency theory which affirms the notion of human beings as the creative agent in negotiating the social structure that is shaped by the social norms as well as the capital.

**Keywords---** Money-Politics, Local Political Leaders Election, Local Economic Elite

## **I. Introduction**

Indonesia is entering a new era of democracy. Following the implementation of the direct presidential and vice-presidential election system, since 2005, the regional-village heads were also directly elected by the people. The implementation of such a direct election system is normatively intended to (1) increase public access to the recruitment of regional political officials, (2) produce regional political officials with higher legitimacy, and (3) reduce the possibility of money politics in the election of regional heads-village.

However, the phenomenon of direct regional-village head election during 2005-2006 actually shows a different fact. Money politics happens everywhere. Theoretically, this phenomenon provokes debate whether the system of direct election and the practice of money politics in regional-village head elections has implications for the actions of prospective candidates or pairs of candidates for regional head-village in choosing ways and means of winning, as well as on patterns of people's voting behaviour.

A number of studies on the relationship between money and politics have been carried out. The results of Brian's study (1970) showed that the problem of money politics had arisen since 600 BC. Drew (1983) pointed out that the practice of money politics has a negative impact on the performance of elected public officials. According to Skinner (2000), money politics and vote-buying constitute political corruption, especially in developing countries such as Thailand and Indonesia. McVey and colleagues (2000) with research sites in Thailand reported that the practice of money politics in Thailand gave rise to business parties, in the sense of becoming a political elite is a way of politically entrepreneurs (*Political Godfather*). Mann and Corrado (2002) stated that the flow of funds in elections in the United States tended to be more complex, and it was difficult to ratify the legal with the illegal. Loewen (2005) unveiled that strategic considerations in determining the spending by regional election candidates influenced the size or size of expenditure compared to the type of expenditure allocation.

In the Indonesian context, Sulistyono and Kadar (2000), who examined the 1999 Indonesian Elections, find that the practice of money politics emerged in all stages of general elections in Indonesia. That is the reason why the party that had a lot of money also won votes. Sherlock (2004), examining the implementation of the Indonesian Election in 2004, revealed that money politics in the legislative elections in Indonesia was one of the impacts of implementing a *single non-transferable vote* (SNTV) system.

In the implementation of the Regional Head Election by the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD). Suwondo (2005) uncovered that the practice of money politics is very symptomatic and shows various forms of money politics practices. Using a more legal approach, Rifai (2003) concludes that the patterns of money politics in local village head elections are based on the time when the money is needed, the strategy of giving money, and the conditions that make money politics not happen.

Based on the review of a number of studies above, several things can be noted. First, all studies were carried out on the holding of legislative elections. Even if there are any studies into the practice of money politics in local-village head elections, they were done when the electoral system was still conducted in an indirect system. Second, in all studies, it has not been equipped with empirical analysis of *community power structures* so that "real government" can be identified (Dahl, 1968).

This study was carried out in the context of direct local-village head elections. It was conducted to reveal the testimonies of various parties involved in the practice of money politics in direct regional-village head elections. This study not only covered the surface description of the practice of money politics but also provided a theoretical meaning to the phenomenon of money politics in village-head elections.

Regarding voting behaviour, there have been many studies conducted on voting behaviour patterns in Indonesia. In general, the flow of political perspectives, according to some previous studies (Feith, 1981; Geertz, 1981; Gaffar, 1992; Mallarangeng, 1997; Nasikun, 1995; Sherlock, 2004), is still considered sufficient to explain voting behaviour in Indonesia.

When voting is not only used for the election of legislators and presidents, important questions arise to be answered. Is the theoretical perspective of *politik aliran* (political parties are marked by 'aliran' (streams) i.e. political parties are identified with specific milieu) still applicable to explain the voting behaviour in regional

elections? In the context of village-regional head elections, which one is more dominant, the *politik aliran* or money politics?

## II. Theoretical Review

### Formal Theoretical Framework

Actors' actions in village-regional head elections were developed based on the Parsons voluntaristic action model (Turner, 1987). This model can be presented as follows:




Figure 1. An Initial Model of Parsons' Voluntaristic Theory of Action

An actor, in taking action to achieve a goal, has a number of choices of means. Norms, values, other ideas, and situational conditions not only provide limits on the goals that may be realized but also limit the choice of means that can be used. Thus, the actor's actions are not entirely free, but rather have choices that are limited by norms, values, and situational conditions.

### Substantive Theoretic Framework

The theoretical framework for how money influences politics can be described as follows (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2003: 10).




Figure 2. The Role of Money in Politics

By describing politics as a system, the flow of money starts from sources of *income*, *expenditure*, and *repayment*. The sources of income and expenditure, in the context of a political official election, lie in the stage of pre-election, while the reverse payment is post-election events.

The sources of income for potential political officials include: big donors, small and medium donors, elected officials and appointees salary surcharges, illegal sources including the use of state resources, public funding, membership dues and income-generating activities, and prospective private funds. All of these financial resources are used both for party and candidate campaign funds.

The budget spending is grouped into three categories, namely legal expenditure, borderline expenditure, and illegal expenditure. The examples of legal spending are the costs of making and distributing brochures, travelling campaigns, transportation, food, t-shirts and other party attributes, posters, television advertisements, and radio broadcast advertisements.

The forms of expenditure located on the boundary between legal and illegal are constituent services such as paying school fees, condolence allowances, and doctor's fees, as well as giving something to voters of significant value. The illegal forms of spending include vote-buying, media bribes, and other bribes.

If by using various financial sources, both legal and illegal, as well as legal, boundary, and illegal spending, a candidate of a political official was elected, then in the post-election period, the elected person must repay all of it both with legal and illegal repayment. The examples of legal repayments are patronage jobs, high appointments in voting, and projects in the election area. Meanwhile, illegal forms of repayment include kickback/bribes, votes for sale, gifts, trips, and the like. Also, it can be in the form of refusing opposition parties and donors to get access.

With reference to the theoretical framework above, we can examine how money has influenced various forms of elections, both Legislative Elections, Presidential Elections, and Regional-village Head Elections.

### **Theoretical Conclusions**

From a number of sources of power and means of obtaining political power, theoretical means, money is one of the sources and means that are very strategic. The real manifestation of the use of money as a source and means of obtaining and perpetuating political power is the practice of money politics in various forms of the election of legislative members and/or political officials. Direct election of regional-village heads is one form of election of political officials.

Although in the election of political officials money is believed to play an important role, it must be noted that the practice of money politics does not take place in a social vacuum, but in the structural context of the community power structure. Hypothetically, it is the practice of elitist money politics. The mass voters, who in most of Indonesia's political economy studies are described as still having economic studies and are quite floating, are easily influenced by elites, especially economic and political elites. If the economic elite controls or conspires with political elites, then the mass voters will be easily influenced to make certain choices.

Money, as a source and means of obtaining and perpetuating political power, can be exchanged with various other means and can be used to develop ways of winning candidates for regent and deputy regent candidates. Money has a very strategic function and tends to be deterministic in the election of district heads which takes place in an elitist power structure, which is specifically dominated by the economic elite. Other sources of power, those in the realm of political society, civil society, and communal society, are very vulnerable to intervention and abuse by the elite of the economic community.

Regarding the transition to democracy, the Demos research team found that the elites, especially the formal political elite, had hijacked most of the momentum of the democratic transition and they took advantage of it (Priyono et al., 2004: 20).

To the extent that the study is not placed in the context of an elitist power structure of society and dominated by the economic elite, the findings of the Demos research team are acceptable. But actually, if the theoretical identification of who actually has the most influence is done carefully, hypothetically it is the elite of the economic community who intervenes into the realm of political society, citizens, and communal society. This has the potential, not to hijack but to disrupt the transition to democracy. Political entrepreneurs have actually done the so-called *praktik ijonin* the process of electing the village head. Economic elites who play politics not only hijack the momentum of the democratic transition but instead divert the democratic transition and those that lead to the sovereignty of the people turn towards the sovereignty of money.

Until the 2004 elections, the *politik aliran* was still important enough to explain voting behaviour in Indonesia, especially Java. However, it is very clear that of all the elections that have been held in Indonesia, up to 2004, all of them were elections to elect members of the legislature. Therefore, the position of the party becomes very important when compared to the figure of legislative candidates and the money spent on winning.

When direct voting is not only used for legislative elections, but also for presidential and village-regional head elections, theoretically the interests of *politik aliran* can be debated. On the one hand, all presidential candidates and class-regional village heads are proposed and supported by political parties. This means that the

party is an important political machine. On the other hand, the appearance of a candidate who of course also has its own influence has implications for the declining the interest level of *politik aliran*. The slogan that emerged in the Presidential Election (2005) that "the Party may be different, but the President is ..." reinforces the increasingly fading *politik aliran* in the direct election of political officials such as presidents, governors, regents or mayors.

Another problem which then arose and supported the allegation that *politik aliran* was faded, was the increasingly clear presence of money politics. There is a tendency that the winners of the direct regional-village head election are those who spend a lot of money in the nomination, campaign and voting stages, which should be observed is the possibility of money politics (Office of Democracy and Governance, 2003: 39). And if money politics can deliver the candidates for regional head-village to be the winner, then it can be concluded that *politik aliran* is increasingly displaced by money politics.

### III. Findings

#### The Context of National and Local Elections

With regard to the national context of the General Elections and Regional Head Elections, the following findings were obtained.

If elections are seen as a form of implementing democracy, it can be concluded that from a number of elections held in Indonesia, there are many trends that the practice of money politics is increasingly happening. The Old Order elections are considered to be more democratic and free from money politics. Elections during the New Order were characterized by the dominance of hegemonic power so that what happened was not political participation but political mobilization. After the New Order, elections were increasingly coloured by a number of actions that were suspected to be money politics practices.

The practice of money politics by the regional political elite is so symptomatic when the Regional House of Representatives(DPRD) has enormous authority to abolish or at least reduce the practice of money politics in local-village head elections. In addition, the direct election of regional-village heads is also based on the spirit to restore sovereignty in the hands of the people.

There are a number of sources of threat to the practice of money politics in direct local-village head elections. Among these are traditions in local-village head elections and a number of practices that have emerged in various legislative and presidential elections. More than that, in terms of legislation, it is also found many gaps that arise because of the provisions relating to the practice of money politics less operational as well as a difficult verification process and sanctions for violations that do not affect the road and the validity of the process of electing the village head directly.

There is a systemic effort to prevent the practice of money politics in direct local-village head elections. Each is through legislation and control by independent monitoring and monitoring institutions. However, considering the many sources of money political threats, there is still no guarantee that these regulations and controls will function properly.

#### Local Political Context and Regional-Village Head Electoral System

Regency/City is one of the regions in East Java that has been the centre of political activity since the century BC. A number of dynasties and political forces took turns controlling the territory and the people of this region.

The phenomenon of dynasties and political forces that continually compete to control Regency/City communities are closely related to the location of a fairly large area, have a high enough natural wealth, have quite a large population, and have a very strategic location both in terms of economic, political and defence.

Based on the developing sub-culture, the Regency/City community can be divided into three ethnic groups and sub-cultures, namely, Javanese ethnic and sub-culture, Madurese ethnic and sub-culture, and other ethnic and sub-cultures. The cultural context of this community is thought to influence election preferences according to the origin of sub-cultural candidates for regents and deputy regents.

Regency/City has very high economic potential. The economic potential that is very prominent and attracts the attention of investors is in the field of tourism, followed by the housing sector, industry, mining and agriculture. Therefore, it is not surprising that many parties want to have the opportunity to be able to exploit the economic potential for the development of their businesses. In order to facilitate the achievement of this goal, close relations with the regent and deputy regent are needed.

The map of Regency/City political power is characterized by the dominance of nationalist parties and religious sects. The change in constellation arose when Golkar emerged as a dominant force nationally. Thus, the three most decisive political forces in the Regency/City are PDI-P, PKB, and the Golkar Party.

The structure of the community power in the Regency/City is dominated by the economic elite. Economic elites intervene not only in determining policy but also in determining an official. Citizens who are not yet well-

off tend to approach and want to become clients of the economic elite. Communal community elites can still be used to support the decisions and desires of the economic elite.

Regarding the regional-village head election system, the following findings are obtained:

1. Each member of the Regency/City General Election Committees (KPUD) originates from and receives support from certain social or political organizations, so it is crucial for outsiders to accuse that both the General Election and the selection of regents and deputy regents of Regency/City KPUD members are not neutral. The issue that arises is not whether the accusation can be proven legally or not, a justification for violations and fraud.

2. Although there is the same general conclusion, that the existing legislation is not yet operational enough to be used as a basis for determining whether an action is a practice of money politics or not, all elements of the organizers, supervisors and observers do not try to "elaborate" the points in these laws and regulations so that they can be used in the field. In other words, the weaknesses in the legislation concerning the election of regional and village heads and deputy regional head-villages remain a weakness at the implementation level.

3. To organizing the election of regents and deputy regents, villages need a large enough budget. However, this does not mean that prospective regents and deputy regents do not spend large budgets either. There is a tendency that the greater the regional budget (APBD) of a region - and Regency/City is quite large - the harder the competition is and the greater the funds that must be spent by the pair of candidates for the head of the region-village.

4. The difficulties encountered when trying to prove the practice of money politics are not comparable with the sanctions that may be imposed on the perpetrators. This not only concerns the difficulty in spelling out the concept of money politics practices but also concerns the manner of proof and the time period between reporting and legal decisions. In fact, while reporting has not yet been followed up, the process of election to the regions continues.

5. Opportunities to conduct money politics can arise in almost all the rules and stages of the implementation of the election of regents and deputy regents. The candidate pair, along with the success team and their supporters, can observe all the rules and opportunities and try to work around them.

### **Money in the Nomination Stage of the Region-Village Head**

Even though the budget provided by the regional government is quite large, in the direct election of region-village head each prospective candidate or regional head-village candidate must spend a significant amount of money. This huge budget is needed to optimize the support of party officials, from the village, sub-district to district levels. Gathering with community leaders, meetings with voting groups and other strategic groups also require funds of hundreds of millions to billions of rupiah.

Political costs must also be spent by prospective candidates to expedite the process of providing recommendations from political elites, both at the local, provincial and national levels. If the prospective candidate does not come from a large enough party, then the budget expenditure at this stage is also greater.

Likewise, if the party used as political awareness has different affiliation groups. Lower-level party administrators also viewed that the networking period was a time for them to be involved and have their own prices. Therefore, with reasons for the development of the organization and so on, they also settled a number of conditions that had money implications for the prospective regents (See Figure 3).

In the case of the election of the Regent and Deputy Regent, the village head is also a prospective candidate who has spent a lot of money long ago, not to obtain recommendations or support from lower-level party administrators, but to build a positive image through various forms of goods and displays that highlight the figure of the future candidate.

These expenses and strategies cannot be categorized as conducting campaigns outside the schedule because they are not conducted in pairs and without candidate numbers.




Figure 3. The Role of Money in the Nominating Stage

The budget expenditure of each prospective candidate at this stage of nomination is different. However, it is certain that if the prospective candidate does not come from a political party that has a large number of voters, and is not supported by a strong source of funding, the prospective candidate might fail to be determined as a candidate for regent or deputy regent, village head candidate.

In summary, because every political party has formal and informal policies that are internal in nature that require money and prospective candidates must adjust to the policy, one can continue to move to the stage of determining as candidates for regent or deputy regent must provide a budget which amounts to hundreds of millions of rupiah to billions of rupiah. Not infrequently, a number of prospective candidates who feel they do not have sufficient sources of funds will resign. Likewise, there are parties that require a certain amount of funding, which sometimes must be agreed by bargaining with prospective candidates.

### Money in the Campaign and Voting Stage

The practice of money politics in regional and village head elections is not only recognized subjectively. This practice appears in the stages of the implementation of the elections, even long before the election stages are started. This form of money politics that is only possible for incumbent candidates is done by mobilizing public budgets for regions that politically benefit themselves. Physical projects in the form of road infrastructure improvements, assistance to educational institutions, partnership projects, assistance to government institutions such as the Indonesian National Military (TNI) and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI), gifts to formal and informal leaders of the community are forms of money politics practices that can be carried out by prospective incumbent.

Money is considered to be very important by almost all actors involved in the village head election, but also objectively pours the highest in the process of achieving goals. Money is the most strategic variable because it has the potential to be converted into various means and other ways. More than that, money can also be used as a tool to get around social structures in the form of norms such as laws. Ways and other means, in the context of rural local elections held under Law No. 32 of 2004, is a necessary condition for the triumph candidates but can not be a sufficient condition to deliver a winning candidate in the election.

Compared to the votes cast of each candidate pair, it would appear that the couple ranked first in the expenditure will also be ranked first in the vote count. Likewise, couples who rank lower in production will also rank lower in voice acquisition.

Based on the entire description and analysis of data, the role of money as a means of political competition in village-regional head elections can be described as follows (See Figure 4).




Figure 4. Money in Campaign and Voting Stage

Money is used not only to buy votes but also to buy mass media news with a contract system, bribing a number of institutions that are responsible for organizing clean, honest and fair regent elections. As is the case in regencies/cities, there are differences in alignments between the Regional-village Head Election Supervisory Committees and the Regional Election Commission, between Election Committees (PPS) from the Regional Election Commission (KPUD) elements and Election Committees (PPS) formed by the head of the sub-district and village heads. All these things cannot be separated from the flexibility of money to be converted into various means in political competition.

Because competition in the election of regents is very tight and through various stages that require the availability of large amounts of funds, logically these funds can rarely be provided by candidates themselves. *Regional Politician-Entrepreneurs* and candidates who originally only needed funds for the regional house of representatives (DPRD) members, now must provide so many funds for so many people, ranging from party members as voters, party administrators to central political party leaders.

Finally, both the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data tend to lead to the same conclusion that in the context of village head elections, the level of political determination of flow tends to decrease when compared to money politics and the political headship of candidates for village head.

#### IV. Conclusions

##### General Conclusions

Based on the discussions above, some general conclusions can be drawn. First, money is a necessary tool, but it is not enough to ensure the candidate pair wins the village-head elections. From a number of other facilities that are also needed, money is the most important means to win the candidates for the village head, because money can be converted into, or exchanged with other necessary facilities.

Second, all the potentials of money as a means of achieving the goals of the candidate pair of regional head-villages can be actualized through two ways: (1) in line with norms, values and rules, or (2) is a way of actualizing potential instrumental money that conflicts with norms, values, and rules, but it is difficult to prove, so it is considered reasonable when it is done.

Third, the absoluteness of money as a means of achieving the goals of the candidate pairs of regional-village heads provides an opportunity for the entry of *Regional Politician-Entrepreneurs* in participating in controlling the course of the election of regional-village heads. In the context of relations between actors in the regional head-village election, money is the most binding. Included in it is a binder for prospective regional-village heads



to *Regional Politician-Entrepreneurs*, which in turn influences public decisions and policies made by regional-village heads so that it benefits the *Regional Politicians-Entrepreneurs*.

Fourth, the direct election of regional heads of villages by the people does not in itself increase juridical, ethical and sociological legitimacy. Ethical legitimacy is largely determined by the quality or level of democratization of the direct implementation of village-head elections. The more democratic a direct regional head election is, the higher the chance of getting a village head who has not only juridical legitimacy but also sociological legitimacy and ethical legitimacy.

Fifth, identification of winners of power at the local level must consider the types of bases or sources of power. In this connection, the source of power in the form of material or money tends to be stronger when compared to the source of power in the form of office. Through ownership of material and money, a person can have almost complete control over which policy the allocation of public resources will be brought. This is done by playing the role of a *Regional Politician-Entrepreneur* who funds a pair of candidates for regional head-village candidates in all stages of the regional-village head election because in turn the pair of elected regional heads will be bound to make public policies that benefit the *Regional Politician-Entrepreneurs*.

Sixth, in the election of political officials that take place as in the presidential, governor, regent, and mayor election, people choose not because of political ideology which in the Indonesian context is *politik aliran*, but because of pragmatic considerations, which in the context Indonesia is a direct benefit. In summary, it can be argued that when political and economic elites are involved in money politics, grassroots voters are trapped in the rationality of money pragmatism.

## Specific Conclusions

### The Meaning of Money in Politics

All actors involved in the election of regional head-villages directly interpret money as indeed not the only means of achieving victory. However, when compared to other means, money is the most decisive means. The meaning of money in direct local-village head elections not only is subjectively recognized as very important by almost all actors involved in village-head elections but also objectively contributes the highest in the process of achieving goals. The beliefs that money is an irreplaceable requirement in village head elections and money can be used as a tool to bargain for social structures in the form of statutory norms and law enforcers implicate the need to fix the theoretical view that humans act always limited by social structure. In reality, humans are not only influenced by social norms but also tend to get around social norms. Theories of social action, including in this connection political action, cannot but have to place humans as not merely producing normative social structures.

### How Money Politics Works

In direct village head elections, money politics works by changing or tweaking social norms, values, ideas about correct politics, and even the conscience of voters, and various situational conditions that limit the possibility of achieving goals. This is possible because money is a flexible facility and has the potential to be exchanged with other facilities as needed. Various laws, parties and constitutions can be changed through the practice of money politics. Other methods and means, in the context of village-regional head elections conducted under the Nomoe Law 32 of 2004, are indeed necessary conditions for the victory of candidates but are not sufficient conditions to deliver a candidate to win in the election.

### The Function of the Practice of Money Politics

Basically, the practice of money politics is to eliminate or at least to reduce uncertainties in the effort to achieve the objectives according to the stages of village-head elections. In the initial stages, money functions to ensure that prospective candidates will be determined to become candidates for regents or regional-village heads. At the campaign stage, the role of money is to ensure that candidates are known, well-loved, and ultimately desirable by potential voters. At the election stage, money is to ensure that voters go to participate in the election activities, the practice of money politics is to bind the elected candidates to give special treatment to those who provide money when in the process of nominating and electing the heads of villages that he participates in. Latently, the practice of money politics is to complicate the process of upholding social norms, including the norms of law.

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